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In or Out of Mortgage Trouble?
A Study of Bankrupt Homeowners
by
Melissa B. Jacoby
Daniel T. McCue
Eric S. Belsky*
INTRODUCTION
For decades, homeowners have populated the bankruptcy system in significant numbers.1 Today’s prevalent narrative features a delinquent mortgage, and a race against time to enlist the bankruptcy system in the fight to
keep the family home. Yet, many bankrupt homeowners do not see themselves reflected in that narrative. In 2007, only about half of bankrupt homeowners identified explicit home- or mortgage-related reasons for filing
bankruptcy.2 The rest told different stories about their paths to bankruptcy
court.
This project investigates what makes homeowners more or less likely to
have mortgage troubles as they head into bankruptcy. We studied factors
that distinguish the non-delinquent from the delinquent, the severely delinquent,3 and then those who reported foreclosure initiation.4 To our knowl*Melissa Jacoby is the Graham Kenan Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill and a Faculty Fellow in UNC’s Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Daniel McCue is a Research
Manager at the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. Eric Belsky is the Managing
Director of the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. We received helpful feedback on
earlier drafts from Scott Baker, Michael Collins, Mirya Holman, Ana Lucia Hurtado, Ken Lam, Meg
Nipson, David Reiss, Elizabeth Warren, and an anonymous reviewer. Thanks to Elizabeth Gibson for
helpful discussion, to Nick Sexton for library support, and to Douglas Debaugh, Noël Giglio, and Michael
Maloney for editorial assistance. This paper uses data from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, the
principal investigators of which are David Himmelstein, Melissa Jacoby, Robert Lawless, Angela Littwin,
Katherine Porter, John Pottow, Teresa Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren, and Steffie Woolhandler. The 2007 CBP was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the AARP, and the FDIC,
and supported by the co-investigators’ respective universities.
1
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 142 (1989) (“The data show, for the first
time, that homeowners are substantial users of bankruptcy.”).
2
Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Mortgage Problems Through the Lens of Bankruptcy, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
171, 176 (2009). Disaggregating the responses, nearly a third of current and recent homeowners reported a
threatened foreclosure, nearly 30% reported wanting but being unable to refinance, and about a quarter
reported that mortgage payments increased beyond what they could afford.
3
For reasons of sample size, specifically the limited number of delinquent borrowers in the sample with
fewer than three missed payments, we used a 120+ day delinquency period and labeled it as “severe.”
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edge, this is the first econometric study of these questions among bankruptcy
filers. We used the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (2007 CBP), which
is a nationally representative dataset about families who filed for bankruptcy
in early 2007.5 Our paper is the first to incorporate substantial information
from a homeowner subsample who answered in-depth questions over the
telephone about their mortgages, their relationships with their loan servicers,
and other issues surrounding homeownership. We also incorporated statelevel information on foreclosure laws and comparative information about
American homeowners from the American Housing Survey.6
Notwithstanding the documented financial stresses on respondents in the
two years prior to bankruptcy,7 roughly half of our homeowner sample had
not missed a single mortgage payment in that period. Those who did stumble
on mortgage payments averaged four missed payments—which, if serial, fell
into the danger zone of serious delinquency.8 Overall, slightly under a third
of the homeowners in our sample reported a foreclosure initiation.
Most notably, we found that credit access had a significant effect on
keeping mortgages current across all of our models.9 Respondents who relied
heavily on credit card debt to manage financial distress were less than half as
likely to have missed a mortgage payment. Among debtors who missed at
least one payment, relying on credit cards made them nearly half as likely to
enter severe mortgage delinquency (e.g., four or more missed payments).
Those who were recently unable to refinance a home mortgage or who resorted to fringe credit were more than twice as likely to have missed one or
more mortgage payments. Credit access also was a statistically significant
determinant of foreclosure initiation. In one of the models, heavy reliance on
credit cards lowered the probability of foreclosure initiation by nineteen percent. Our findings add to the complex picture of the intersections between
consumer credit, homeownership, and mortgage default that are important to
regulatory design.10
Missed mortgage payments also were associated with a substantial drop
in income—a problem that also has been documented outside the bankruptcy
4

Because foreclosure initiation and missed payments can influence each other, we tried two different
models. See infra Part IIIC and Appendix C.
5
Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82
AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008).
6
U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey 2005, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
ahs/ahs.html (last visited May 20, 2011).
7
Lawless et al., supra note 5, at 382.
8
The home mortgage industry regards 90+ day delinquencies as “serious.” Bankrupt homeowners who
were at or above the average reported foreclosure initiations at a rate of 60%.
9
See infra Part III.C.
10
See infra Part IV.A.
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field11—and with the use of a mortgage broker, which may have signified
that the loan carried particularly high costs.12 These characteristics decreased the feasibility of saving a home in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law offers
a debtor a valuable right to cure a home mortgage,13 but high-cost loans or
many months of back payments plus penalty fees make doing so quite difficult.14 Debtors must make cure payments while also resuming monthly mortgage payments. The price tag for this relief is high for other reasons as well:
the homeowners’ right to cure in bankruptcy is conditioned on payment of
substantial administrative costs and other debts. Thus, our findings suggest
that the filers most in need of curing a mortgage have other financial hardships, which lean in favor of several reforms to chapter 13.15
We also found that foreclosure initiation among bankruptcy filers was
significantly associated with the timelines for foreclosure established by state
law.16 Under one model approach, foreclosure initiation was less likely in
states with long foreclosure timelines. An alternative model found initiation
more likely in states with short timelines, holding all else constant. Although
these results are more tentative due to limitations of our data, these findings
support a functional analysis of federal bankruptcy and state debtor-creditor
laws as an integrated system. In such a system, innovations to state foreclosure laws can improve the operation of consumer bankruptcy law.17
Part I situates our project within the scholarly literature on home mortgage default and homeowners in bankruptcy. Part II explains our dataset and
methods. Part III contains our findings and discusses the limits of our project.
Part IV considers the implications of the findings for consumer credit regulation, bankruptcy law, and state foreclosure law reform.
I. MORTGAGE DEFAULT, CURE AND BANKRUPTCY: AN
ABBREVIATED LITERATURE REVIEW
Real estate finance scholars have long been interested in the risk factors
11

See infra text accompanying note 97.
See infra note 100.
13
11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325(a)(5) (2010).
14
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First
Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 782 (2010); John
Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan
Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1164-67 (2008); Susan E. Hauser, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The
Case For Allowing Mortgage Modification in Bankruptcy, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207 (2010); Adam J.
Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modifications of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565
(2009); Juliet M. Moringiello, Mortgage Modification, Equitable Subordination, and the Honest but Unfortunate Creditor, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599 (2011); Rich Leonard, A Win-Win Bankruptcy Reform,
WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2008, at A29.
15
See infra Part IV.B.
16
See infra Part III.C.
17
See infra Part IV.C.
12
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for residential mortgage default and its consequences.18 Many studies find
negative home equity to be a major determinant of mortgage default.19 Nonetheless, only a small fraction of homeowners with negative net equity actually default, so equity levels cannot fully explain the patterns.20 Other
factors that have been studied include the role of consumer credit availability,21 expectations of future house price appreciation, household income and
wealth,22 adverse events such as job loss or health problems,23 whether or
not the applicable state law requires that foreclosure be accomplished
18

Roberto Quercia & Spencer M. Cowan, The Impacts of Community-based Foreclosure Prevention
Programs, 23 HOUSING STUD. 461, 464 (2008); see also Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative
Servicing Technology: Smart Enough to Keep People in their Houses?, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING
CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 348, 362 (Nicolas S. Retsinas & Eric S.
Belsky eds., 2005).
19
Robert Avery et al., Credit Risk, Credit Scoring, and the Performance of Home Mortgages, FED. RES.
BULL., 1996, at 621- 648; Raisa Bahchieva, Susan Wachter & Elizabeth Warren, Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability of Homeownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73, 92 (Patrick
Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005); Michael LaCour-Little, Equity Dilution: An Alternative Perspective on Mortgage Default, 32 R.E. ECON. 359 (2004); Thomas M. Springer & Neil G. Waller, Termination
of Distressed Residential Mortgages: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. R.E. FIN. & ECON. 43 (1993); Michael A.
Stegman, An Affordable Homeownership Strategy that Promotes Savings Rather than Risk, in ENDING
POVERTY IN AMERICA: HOW TO RESTORE THE AMERICAN DREAM 165 (John Edwards, Marion Crain &
Arne L. Calleberg eds., 2007).
20
See Cutts & Green, supra note 18, at 359; Ronel Elul et al., What ‘Triggers’ Mortgage Default? 2 (Fed
Res. Bank Phila., Working Paper No. 10-13, Apr. 2010). Even in an extreme case like Boston in the early
1990s, less than ten percent of those with negative net equity defaulted. Kristopher Gerardi, Manuel
Adelino, & Paul S. Millen, Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosure (Fed. Res. Bank Bos., Working Paper No. 07-12, 2007).
21
Ethan Cohen-Cole & Jonathan Morse, Your House or Your Credit Card, Which Would You Choose?
Personal Delinquency Tradeoffs and Economic Spillovers (Fed. Res. Bank Bos., Working Paper No.
QAU09-5, 2009). This study of decisions made in 2006 and 2007 of homeowners with at least one credit
card and under moderate financial strains suggests that cash-strapped homeowners with falling home values chose mortgage default over credit card default to preserve access to liquidity for everyday living
expenses. Id. at 3, 18. However, mortgage affordability is also an important consideration. Id. at 18; see
also Elul et al., supra note 20, at 8-9 (using credit card utilization as proxy for illiquidity and finding
illiquidity to be significantly associated with mortgage default).
22
Gerardi, Adelino, & Millen, supra note 20.
23
For studies suggesting that trigger-events (such as job loss, health problems, death, and divorce or
other family breakup) may play a strong role if they impact household incomes for an extended period of
time, see, e.g., Terrence M. Clauretie, State Foreclosure Laws, Risk Shifting, and the PMI Industry, 56 J. OF
RISK & INS. 544 (1989); Amy C. Cutts. Facts and Figures on New Mortgage Products Protecting Consumers in the New Mortgage Marketplace (F.T.C. Workshop 2006); Peter J. Elmer & Steven A, Seelig, The
Rising Long-Term Trend of Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Rates (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Working
Paper No. 88-2, 1998). For studies finding a less clear relationship, see, e.g., Dennis R. Capozza & Thomas
A. Thomson, Subprime Transitions: Lingering or Malingering in Default?, 33 J. R.E. FIN. & ECON. 241
(2006); Roberto Quercia & Michael Stegman, Residential Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, 3 J.
OF HOUSING RES. 341 (1992). Ambrose & Capone reconciled these studies by suggesting the existence of
multiple types of defaulters, and recommended that servicers offer consensual workouts to trigger event
defaulters who have a demonstrated desire to avoid foreclosure. Brent Ambrose & Charles Capone, Modeling the Conditional Probability of Foreclosure in the Context of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosure Resolutions, 26 R.E. ECON. 391, 394 (1998).
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through the filing of a law suit,24 and the state’s mandatory timeline for
foreclosure.25
Scholars also have examined determinants of curing mortgages after default. Researchers and policymakers often assert that lenders should preserve
homeownership wherever possible because foreclosure imposes steep costs.26
In theory (and perhaps only in theory), servicers will seek loss mitigation and
workouts if the expected net present value of facilitating them is greater than
that of pursuing foreclosure.27 For example, in an important study of delinquent mortgages in Freddie Mac’s portfolio, Cutts and Merrill made the following observations: loss of income is more detrimental to cure than extreme
debt obligations; a state law foreclosure timeline may have a “sweet spot”
that promotes cure; lack of servicer-borrower communication is common
among the accounts that result in foreclosure; actual loan modifications (e.g.,
reduction of principal) lower the failure rate of workouts; shorter repayment
plans are more successful than longer plans; and post-delinquency counseling
as well as early intervention (e.g., shorter delinquency period) improved the
odds of cure.28 Concluding that loan modifications were successful tools for
24

Clauretie, supra note 23; Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect of State Foreclosure
Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence from the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 221 (1990); Amy C. Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and
Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER & MORTGAGE
CREDIT REVISITED 203, 207, 230, 241 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008); Karen M. Pence,
Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177 (2006).
25
Cutts & Merrill, supra note 24, at 231-37.
26
Quercia & Cowan, supra note 18.
27
Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home
Mortgages? The Effect of Securitization (Fed. Res. Bank Bos. & NBER Working Paper No. 2009-17a,
2010). For arguments that principal-agent problems have prevented this theory from bearing out in practice in recent years, see Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(2011). The financial crisis highlighted other potential barriers to mortgage curing, including structural
barriers and alleged constraints on servicers created by the legal contracts that govern the securitization of
mortgages. See Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Homeowners: Avoiding a
New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 153, 169-78 (2011); see also Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy: Past Puzzles, Legal Reforms, and the
Mortgage Crisis, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 15-17 (2009).
28
Cutts & Merrill, supra note 24, at 203; see also Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Duration of Foreclosures in the Subprime Mortgage Market: A Competing Risks Model with Mixing, 40 J. R.E. FIN. & ECON.
109 (2010) (finding that loans delinquent for longer periods of time before entering a repayment plan were
more likely to fail than those with shorter delinquency periods). But see Lei Ding, Roberto G. Quercia &
Janneke Ratcliffe, Post-purchase Counseling and Default Resolutions among Low-and-Moderate Income Borrowers, 30 J. R.E. RES. 315 (2008) (using different dataset, finding that longer periods of delinquency led to
lower likelihood of loan termination through foreclosure). For additional research on the role of borrowerservicer communication in fostering workouts, see Jay Brinkman, An Examination of Mortgage Foreclosures, Modifications, Repayment Plans, and other Loss Mitigation Activities in the Third Quarter of 2007,
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Jan. 2008; Home Ownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI): Partnership Lessons
& Results, THREE YEAR FINAL REPORT (July 17, 2006) http://www.nw.org/network/neighborworks
Progs/foreclosuresolutions/pdf_docs/hopi3YearReport_071706.pdf.
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curing mortgages, Cutts and Merrill argued that lawmakers should consider
reducing barriers to modifications.29
Scholars have wrestled with the role of race and ethnicity in many dimensions of homeownership, including the propensity for mortgage cure.30 For
example, Quercia and Cowan found that black homeowners who were delinquent on their mortgages were forty percent less likely to avoid foreclosure
than white homeowners, but, as the authors note, they lacked controls for
variables (interest rate, home equity) that studies have shown to correlate
with minority affiliation.31 Other papers have suggested that the racial identity of the borrower could be a proxy for neighborhood characteristics such
as house price trends that affect lender and servicer behavior.32 Among papers that study homeownership and racial identity of bankruptcy filers, the
studies illustrate, without controls, that black homeowners (and to a lesser
extent Hispanic homeowners) have a far greater likelihood of filing for bankruptcy than white homeowners.33 Indeed, black homeowners have been
29

Cutts & Merrill, supra note 24, at 221. But see Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 27 (arguing
that true costs of modification cannot easily be determined beforehand because delinquent loans may selfcure without modification and modified loans may default).
30
For a recent example, see J. Michael Collins & Carolina Reid, Who Receives a Mortgage Modification? Race and Income Differentials in Loan Workouts 18 (Fed. Res. Bank of S.F. Cmty. Dev. Working
Paper No. 2010-07, 2010) (finding “no evidence of racial disparities among those who receive loan modifications” under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), and noting contrast with other racerelated mortgage research). See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, From Credit Denial To
Predatory Lending: The Challenge of Sustaining Minority Homeownership, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING
COSTS FOR AMERICA 81-123 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, eds. 2008) (discussing a range of
homeownership-related challenges for African American and Latino households).
31
Quercia & Cowan, supra note 18, at 464. For the studies showing correlation, see, e.g., Ambrose &
Capone, supra note 23; Mickey Lauria, Vern Baxter, & Bridget Bordelon, An Investigation of the Time
Between Mortgage Default and Foreclosure, 19 HOUSING STUD. 581 (2004).
32
Harold Black, Breck Robinson & Robert Schweitzer, Do Lenders Discriminate Against Low-Income
Borrowers, 28 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 73-94 (2001); Robert T. Clair, The Performance of Black-Owned
Banks in their Primary Market Areas, ECONOMIC REVIEW (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Nov. 1988)
11-20; David K. Horne, Mortgage Lending, Race, and Model Specification, 11 J. OF FIN. SERV. RES. 43
(1997); Edward C. Lawrence, The Viability of Minority-Owned Banks, 37 Q. REV. OF ECON. & FIN. 1
(1997); Anthony M. Yezer, Robert F. Phillips & Robert P. Trost, Bias in Estimates of Discrimination and
Default in Mortgage Lending: The Effects of Simultaneity and Self Selection, 9 J. R.E. FIN. & ECON. 197
(1994); Raphael W. Bostic & Glenn B. Canner, Do Minority-Owned Banks Treat Minorities Better? An
Empirical Test of the Cultural Affinity Hypothesis (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Working Paper
No 94-2, 1997).
33
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 214-15, 221, 234 (2000) (reviewing data from 1991); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS &
FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 159 (2003); Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making it to
the Middle is No Longer Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1789 (2004) (reviewing data from 2001).
For a parallel finding for black college graduates in the 2007 CBP, see Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational
Loans, & Bankruptcy, 16 MICH J. RACE & L. 1, 10-12 (2010). Black bankruptcy filers in the 2007 CBP
also were less likely to be represented by a lawyer in their filings, increasing the likelihood that they would
run into challenges obtaining debt relief. Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer
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more likely to file for bankruptcy than black renters.34
Although real estate finance scholarship historically has not given detailed consideration to bankruptcy law,35 literally millions of homeowners
with mortgages have passed through the bankruptcy system.36 The landmark
studies by Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook offered a glimpse of these households’ demographics.37 Homeowners who filed for bankruptcy in 1981 had
higher incomes and greater debt than non-homeowners.38 Furthermore, 7.5%
of bankrupt homeowners had mobile homes.39 A third of bankrupt homeowners reported at least a second mortgage, and some reported three or
more—far outstripping the general population at that time.40 Homeowners
experienced significant disruptions in income in the two years prior to filing
and were more likely to be self-employed than renters.41 The homeowners
reported relatively high non-mortgage debts, which might indicate an attempt to free up cash for mortgage payments.42
From their study of homeowners who filed for bankruptcy in 1991, Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook reported some of the same story: the homeowners had higher incomes but greater debts than non-homeowners, a third also
Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933,
1966 (2011). A different study illustrates the overrepresentation of African American households in bankruptcy more generally. Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study of Consumers’ Post-Discharge Finances:
Struggle, Stasis, or Fresh Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 300 (2008). For an analysis of how
bankruptcy law generally has a disparate impact on white and black filers, see A. Mechele Dickerson, Race
Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1725 (2004); Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors:
Bankruptcy Disparities by Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231 (2009).
34
Warren, The Economics of Race, supra note 33, at 1791.
35
Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 332-33
(2007) (“Some researchers clearly are aware that bankruptcy plays some role, but tend not to build bankruptcy – and certainly not chapter 13 in particular – into their analyses. Thus, very few real estate
studies even acknowledge the existence of chapter 13 and its antiforeclosure provisions, let alone try to
study its impact or compare it to state law and other approaches.”). See Capozza & Thomson, supra note
23, at 248 (from their sample reporting that “bankrupt loans rarely find their way to cure” but failing to
distinguish between chapters 7 and 13 and thus putting too short a time horizon on their study). An
unpublished working paper using the very small sample of bankruptcy filers in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics found a negative effect of bankruptcy on homeownership, especially in chapter 7. Cheryl Long,
Negative Effects of Personal Bankruptcy for Homeowners: Lost Homes and Reduced Credit Access (Conference Draft, Fed. Res. Board of Chi., 2005), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf
_paper_session2_long.pdf.
36
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 142; Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra
note 19, at 92. More than half of the filers in the 2007 CBP are homeowners. Lawless et al., supra note 5,
at 365 n.63; see also Zagorsky & Lupica, supra note 33, at 296 (reporting 59% homeownership rate among
bankruptcy filers in their sample).
37
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1. However, saving homes may have been the
filers’ goal even if their mortgage was current. Id. at 135.
38
Id. at 131.
39
Id. at 129.
40
Id. at 133-34.
41
Id. at 136-37.
42
Id.
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had a second mortgage or more, and a quarter had no equity in their homes.43
Younger homeowners had a greater propensity to be in bankruptcy than
older homeowners.44 Job loss outpaced mortgage problems as the precipitating event leading to bankruptcy for this group: fourteen percent of the homeowners reported a specific mortgage problem as a reason for bankruptcy in
response to an open-ended question, but more than half reported job losses.45
A study of homeowners who filed for bankruptcy in 2001 revealed that
more than half had little or no home equity; the authors surmised that second
mortgages contributed to this finding.46 The prevalence of second mortgages
and corresponding lack of equity presumably made attempts to retain homes
more tenuous.47
Given the tools that bankruptcy law offers, a growing number of theoretical and empirical papers have discussed the role of bankruptcy in saving
homes from foreclosure.48 One empirical study observed that debtors are
hindered in their efforts to save their homes, finding that there were inflated
fees and improper mortgage documentation in a substantial portion of the
cases.49 Using the same dataset of chapter 13 homeowners, another study
found that “more than two-thirds of bankrupt families live in unaffordable or
severely unaffordable housing according to standards used by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development.”50 In other words, home-saving was
not feasible without more substantial debt restructuring and reduction.
Now that it is common knowledge that chapter 13 filers often do not
complete their multi-year payment plans, scholars have examined the success
of mortgage curing and homeownership sustainability after a bankruptcy filing. For example, in a study of Delaware bankruptcy filings in 2001 and
2002, researchers found bankruptcy delayed home loss due to foreclosure by
approximately one year, but 28% of the homeowners had lost their homes to
43

SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 33, at 224.
Id. at 207.
45
Id. at 227, 229.
46
Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 19, at 95-96.
47
See sources cited, supra note 19.
48
See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 35, at 332-33; Eric S. Nguyen, Parents in Financial Crisis: Fighting to
Keep the Family Home, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (2008); Katherine Porter, Misbehavior & Mistake in
Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2008); Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your
Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (2010) (discussing prominence of home saving as
reason for homeowners to file for chapter 13 bankruptcy).
49
Porter, supra note 48, at 123 (“The data revealed in this Article suggest, however, that homemortgage lenders often disobey the law . . . [t]hese problems can cripple a family’s efforts to save its home
and undermine policies that promote sustainable home ownership.”); id. at 129, 133 (explaining that several
months of missed mortgage payments can lead to default charges, penalty fees, and foreclosure costs, all of
which must be paid to cure the mortgage in chapter 13).
50
Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 14.
44
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foreclosure by October 2007.51 Another study estimated that less than 1%
of those who would have defaulted are able to save their home through chapter 13, but this percentage would rise to over 10% if debtors could modify
mortgages based on the home’s current market value as some lawmakers have
proposed.52
II. A STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF MISSED PAYMENTS
AND FORECLOSURE INITIATION: DATA AND METHODS
A. DATA
As previous articles have explained, the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project is a national random sample of people who filed for chapter 7 or chapter
13 bankruptcy from February through April of 2007.53 The CBP draws on a
written questionnaire completed by all respondents, bankruptcy schedules
submitted by filers under penalty of perjury, other court record data relating
to motions filed and judicial orders entered, and telephone interviews for a
subset of respondents that were completed between September 2007 and
February 2008. Table A-1 in Appendix A provides descriptive statistics for
this subsample on variables used in our analysis. As explained later, we also
used geographic data, including categories of state foreclosure law, for some of
our analysis, and used American Housing Survey data to understand how
bankrupt homeowners in 2007 differed from the general population.54
The 2007 CBP includes demographic and socioeconomic data typically
not available in studies that rely on mortgage servicing databases. Examples
include age, education, race/ethnicity, family history, other debts, forms of
borrowing, specific triggers of financial problems, and stated reasons for delinquency. However, we lacked some information frequently used in other nonbankruptcy studies. Although we had expected to construct loan-to-value
ratios, the number of missing values in our homeowner sub-sample was too
great and the bias too systematic between the cases with and without missing variables to include them in our models. When possible, we created proxies or used self-reported information to substitute for variables commonly
found in servicing databases. For example, because we lacked credit scores,
we constructed additional proxy variables to approximate creditworthiness.
51

Sarah W. Carroll & Wenli Li, The Homeownership Experience of Households in Bankruptcy, 13
CITYSCAPE 113, 115, 124 (2011); see also Cutts & Green, supra note 18, at 370 (finding that bankruptcy
reduced the probability of mortgage failure within the study period because foreclosure proceedings were
enjoined during the bankruptcy case).
52
White & Zhu, supra note 48, at 57 (“if cram down of mortgages in Chapter 13 were introduced, the
proportion of Chapter 13 filers who save their homes rather than default would increase 10-fold”).
53
For an in-depth explanation of the methods, including tests for sample bias, see Lawless et al., supra
note 5.
54
Appendix A, Table A-2.
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“Bad access to credit” is a simple binary variable to identify those who were
recently unable to refinance their homes or who had taken out a car-title or
payday loan. These circumstances indicate impaired or limited access to
mainstream credit options.
B. MODELS
1. Missed Payments
To explore determinants of missed payments among homeowners, we fit a
logistic model with a set of variables intended to capture various potentially
relevant aspects of each filer’s situation available from the three 2007 CBP
sources (bankruptcy court files, written questionnaire, and housing telephone
survey).55 We ran the logistic model on all homeowners with a mortgage in
our sample. The binary decision in the first model is whether or not the
debtor missed any mortgage payments in the two years before bankruptcy.56
We also modeled the probability of being severely delinquent (missing
four or more payments) among those who missed at least one mortgage payment. While the number of reported missed payments were not necessarily
consecutive (a limitation of the data), the latter model reflects what causes
filers to miss multiple payments once they missed at least one.57
2. Foreclosure Initiation
Studying determinants of foreclosure initiations is challenging. A borrower missing one or more mortgage payments may influence the decision of
a loan servicer to initiate foreclosure, and vice versa. The more payments a
borrower misses, the more likely a lender will threaten or initiate foreclosure.
Once foreclosure has been initiated or seems likely, the debtor may not see
much point to making subsequent payments. The 2007 CBP does not establish an exact week-by-week timetable of the events within the two-year period. This makes it difficult to distinguish between missed payments before
and after foreclosure initiation.
To deal with this issue, we constructed two different models of foreclosure initiation. First, in the absence of a suitable exogenous instrument for
the number of missed mortgage payments, we created an instrument through
a first-stage ordinary least squares regression.58 In our second specification,
we controlled for the number of missed payments on the propensity of lend55

We also ran models as simple linear regressions and the results were not substantially different.
The logistic model is particularly suitable given our interest in the determinants of the likelihood of
missing a payment, a binary outcome, as well as our use of a number of dichotomous covariates from the
survey.
57
Descriptive statistics on these variables are presented in Appendix A, Table A-1.
58
Because so many variables that drive missed payments also drive lenders’ decisions about initiating
foreclosures, the first stage must use a parsimonious specification that attempts to meet the tests of a
sound instrument while allowing variables that likely influence both decisions to be preserved for use in
56
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ers to initiate a foreclosure by using a subsample of delinquent borrowers
who missed a similar number of payments (three to five payments).
To study foreclosure initiation, we also included additional geographic
variables not associated with missed payments. Using categories discussed in
the work of Cutts and Merrill, we took into account the length of the foreclosure process in the homeowner’s state of residence.59 Whether the state
allows for a non-judicial foreclosure process was added as a dependent variable.60 To control for geographic factors to the greatest extent possible, we
also added variables for high- and low- income counties.61
III. FINDINGS
A. DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS ABOUT BANKRUPT HOMEOWNERS
We compared this homeowner sample to national American Housing Survey data.62 A higher percentage of bankrupt homeowners identified themselves as black compared to national data, consistent with prior research on
this issue.63 The sample also contained a higher percentage of divorced homeowners and women than in the general population. A greater percentage of
respondents had some college (but no degree), and a lower percentage were
college graduates, than in the general population.
Table A-1 identifies the descriptive statistics for variables used in the
models. It includes the following notable findings:
• Slightly over half (54%) missed at least one mortgage payment in
the two years prior to filing for bankruptcy, and the average
among those who missed at least one payment was four.
• One in four had an adjustable rate mortgage, higher than the national average.
• A third used mortgage brokers to originate their mortgage loans.
• One out of five had a mobile home, a substantially higher proportion than found in an earlier study.64
the second-stage model. The resulting instrument was rather weak and still included variables that may
have independent influence on initiation of foreclosure.
59
Cutts & Merrill, supra note 24, at 203. Fast foreclosure states are the third of states with the
shortest foreclosure timeline, while slow foreclosure states are the third of states with the longest timeline.
60
This has a low correlation with the length of foreclosure timelines. Id.
61
We defined these as those with median household incomes that are respectively greater than 110%
and less than 90% of their relevant state median incomes according to the 2000 U.S. Census.
62
Appendix A, Table A-1. Table A-2 compares this homeowner sub-sample to others in the 2007
CBP.
63
See supra text accompanying notes 33 & 34.
64
See supra note 39.
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• Half of the homeowners in our sample were first-time homebuyers,
higher than the national average.
Additional descriptors of note include the following:
• Half of the homeowners in the housing telephone survey sample
reported refinancing a loan at some point.65
• Thirty percent reported taking out a home equity line of credit.66
• Sixty percent reported either taking out a home equity line of
credit or refinancing at some point.
• Paying off credit cards was the most popular reason debtors offered for refinancing a mortgage or taking out a home equity loan.
• Reverse mortgages were virtually non-existent in this sample.
Respondents also reported a very high level of contact with their mortgage servicers, which is key to the possibility of workouts.67 Slightly over
four out of five respondents said that their mortgage servicers contacted them
about missed payments, and this resulted in communication for nearly all of
these respondents.68 This is a much higher rate of contact than is discussed in
the general literature.69 As a consequence, though, there was insufficient variation in this factor for inclusion in the models.
B. RESULTS

FROM

MISSED PAYMENTS MODELS

1. Determinants of missing at least one payment
The results of the model are presented fully in Appendix B, Table B-1,
including factors often discussed but not found significant in our model. The
findings reveal several factors that are statistically significant in their impact
on missing payments, after controlling for the independent influence of each
other variable:
• Credit access: Respondents who relied heavily on credit card
debt to manage financial distress were less than half as likely to
have missed a mortgage payment. At the same time, those who
65

The question was “Before filing for bankruptcy, was there ever a time that you refinanced your
mortgage loan? In other words, did you ever pay off your mortgage loan and replace it with another one?”
2007 CBP Housing Telephone Survey, H28 (2007) (on file with authors).
66
The question was “Before filing for bankruptcy, was there ever a time that you took out a home
equity loan, home equity line of credit or a home improvement loan? In other words, did you ever take out
a loan or line of credit IN ADDITION to your primary mortgage?” 2007 CBP Housing Telephone
Survey, H31 (2007) (on file with authors).
67
See supra text accompanying note 28.
68
2007 CBP Housing Telephone Survey, H42 & H43 (2007) (on file with authors).
69
See generally Collins & Reed, supra note 30, at 7 (reviewing research on borrower-servicer contact,
and reporting that about half of foreclosure sales lack “reciprocal contact”); Porter, supra note 48, at 132
(discussing examples of difficulties experienced by homeowners in reaching their loan servicers).
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were recently unable to refinance their homes or who had taken
out a car-title or payday loan were more than twice as likely to
have missed a mortgage payment than other filers.
• Income problems: Homeowners who reported that their household income “decreased significantly” in the two years prior to filing bankruptcy were nearly twice as likely to miss a mortgage
payment in that period as other respondents.
• Mortgage broker: Using a mortgage broker increased a filer’s
likelihood of missing at least one mortgage payment by 64%.
• Chapter 13: Chapter 13 filers were nearly twice as likely to have
missed a mortgage payment as chapter 7 filers. This is consistent
with a now-common characterization of chapter 13 as a form of
mortgagor protection.
• Self-identified mortgage problems: Our model illustrated a
strong connection between missed mortgage payments and reporting mortgage payment problems as a reason for a bankruptcy filing.70 Those who identified mortgage payment problems as a
reason for their bankruptcies were three times as likely to have
missed a payment as those not claiming this as a reason. These
findings reinforce the relevance of asking debtors why they filed
for bankruptcy, which is one of the CBP’s signature methodologies.
Debtors exercise discretion when characterizing their reasons for
bankruptcy and do not merely point to all reasons that might be
potentially available.71
We found no significant relationship between missing a mortgage payment
and any of our demographic variables such as race, age, and education. The
model produced no significant association between missing a mortgage payment and having an adjustable rate mortgage despite the potential for rate
adjustments to create payment shocks that trigger loan defaults.
2. Determinants of missing four or more payments
In Appendix B, table B-1’s right-most column reports the odds of a debtor
missing four or more payments (“severe delinquency”) among those who
missed at least one. This model is less robust—very few variables appear
significant and only one of these also appears as significant in the first model
70

The 2007 CBP gave all respondents a list of reasons for filing for bankruptcy and asked them to
check any that applied to them. Several on the list related to housing or mortgage problems. See supra
note 2.
71
Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J.
OF HEALTH, POL’Y L. & ETH. 239, 273 (2010).
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of any missed payments—but we report some key findings here:72
• Self-employment: Being self-employed was the strongest determinant of severe delinquency among this group. Self-employed
debtors were more than two and a half times as likely to go into
severe delinquency as other debtors. This may reflect income fluctuations that reduced the ability to keep up payments.
• Credit: Access to credit cards again appeared as an important determinant. Relying heavily on credit cards made a debtor who had
missed at least one mortgage payment nearly half as likely to go
into severe delinquency.
• College degree: Although demographic factors were not significant in the first model, having a bachelor’s degree made a borrower
who missed a payment half as likely to become severely delinquent
compared to those who went to college but did not earn a bachelor’s degree.
C. FORECLOSURE INITIATION MODELS
Appendix C contains complete results for these models. As previously
noted, our first foreclosure initiation model, an Ordinary Least Squares
model, used a two-stage approach to address the interrelatedness of decisions
to miss payments and foreclosure initiation. Our second model focused on a
subsample of borrowers who missed three to five payments (half the sample
that missed payments) and thus should have similar probabilities of foreclosure initiation. Several factors were significant in both models:
• Credit: Credit access factors were statistically significant determinants of foreclosure initiation. In the subsample model, heavy
reliance on credit cards lowered the probability of foreclosure initiation by nineteen percentage points. In the two-stage model, bad
access to mainstream credit raised the probability of foreclosure
initiation by twenty percentage points.73
• State foreclosure law: In the two-stage model, living in a state
with a long foreclosure timeline was associated with an eighteen
percentage point decrease in the propensity of foreclosure initiation. In the subsample model, living in a state that permits quick
foreclosure increased the probability of foreclosure initiation. The
72

For a discussion of the robustness of this model and the difficulties introduced by our inability to
determine the timing of missed payments, see Appendix B.
73
Heavy reliance on credit cards was not included directly in the two-stage model for comparison
because the two-stage model used it to form a proxy for missed mortgage payments. Its significance in the
subsample model supports the assertion that heavy credit card use was individually associated with both
missed mortgage payments and foreclosure initiation.
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findings of the two models are consistent, though it is interesting
to note that the long foreclosure timeline dummy variable was not
statistically significant in the subsample model and the quick foreclosure dummy variable was not statistically significant in the
two-stage model.
• Age: Relative to adults aged thirty-six to fifty-five, both models
showed adults over age fifty-five to have significantly lower
probabilities of foreclosure initiation. Being over fifty-five years
old was the most statistically significant negative covariate in the
three-to-five-missed-payment subsample model, lowering the
probability of foreclosure initiation by forty-nine percentage
points.74 Age could proxy for several factors, such as longer credit
history and better credit score, or steadier income, making older
respondents seem to servicers to be a safer bet to cure. Older
homeowners could also have had more time to build equity in their
homes, which could translate into lower debt-equity ratios and potentially greater access to funds.75
• Self-identified mortgage problems: In both models, there was
a significant positive relationship between foreclosure initiation
and identifying mortgage payment burdens as a reason for bankruptcy. As with the missed payments model, these findings reinforce the relevance of, and internally validate, debtors’ own direct
descriptions of their problems.
These two models produced inconsistent results on racial identity and having
children in the household. Minority status was significant to foreclosure initiation in the two-stage model, consistent with other research.76 Self-identification of the primary petitioner as African American or another racial or
ethnic minority increased the probability of foreclosure initiation by eighteen
percent even after controlling for our credit access variables and county-level
geographic controls. This variable was not significant in the subsample
model. We were unable to determine whether this variable is a proxy for
credit score and therefore reduces the significance of other credit proxies in
the model.77 Alternatively, minority status could be a proxy for neighbor74

Although the overall likelihood of bankruptcy is thought to decrease with age, comparisons of Consumer Bankruptcy Project data over time suggest that Americans aged fifty-five and older have had the
sharpest increases in bankruptcy filings from 1991 to 2007. Deborah Thorne, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Generations of Struggle, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (2008), available at http://assets.aarp.org/
rgcenter/consume/2008_11_debt.pdf.
75
Filers in our sample who were fifty-five and older were the most likely to refinance or take out a
home equity line of credit.
76
Quercia & Cowan, supra note 18, at 464.
77
There is some evidence that credit scores are lower on average for black and Hispanic borrowers
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hood location that affects loan servicer decisions, as concluded in previous
studies.78 We were unable to control for some financial, employment, and
neighborhood characteristics that studies have shown to reduce, though not
always eliminate, disparities in outcomes between distressed black and white
homeowners.79 In addition, the relatively small sample size limited the ability
to test certain characteristics of race and ethnicity.80
The two-stage model found that having children in the household was
associated with a significantly lower probability of foreclosure initiation even
after controlling for the number of missed payments. The finding may reflect
parents’ especially strong desire to avoid foreclosure that leads to other actions that we cannot measure.81 In the subsample model, though, having children in the household did not rise to the level of statistical significance.
D. LIMITS OF OUR STUDY
Our study’s primary limit was that we were missing some important varithan for white borrowers, though one careful study found that the independent variables used in credit
scoring models do not have a disparate impact on how minorities are scored. For studies that suggest
credit scores vary systematically by race and ethnicity, see Raphael W. Bostic et al., Hitting the Wall:
Credit as an Impediment to Homeownership, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT 155-172 (Nicolas P.
Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress
on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit, submitted to the Congress
pursuant to § 215 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (August 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/default.htm. For a study showing
that the independent variables used in credit scoring models are correlated with future loan performance
within each group rather than serving as a proxy for representation within a single group, see Robert B.
Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, & Glenn B. Canner, Does Credit Scoring Produce a Disparate Impact? (Fed.
Reserve Bd. Divisions of Res. & Stat. & Monetary Aff., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 2010-58, 2010).
78
See supra note 32.
79
E.g., Alicia H. Munnell et. al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data (Fed. Res.
Bank Bos., Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992).
80
See infra note 120.
81
Some research has examined the special difficulties faced by families with school-aged children when
they are involuntarily relocated, suggesting that they might fight harder to keep their homes even after
they stumble in their mortgage payments. Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37
PEPP. L. REV. 511, 521-23 (2010); Nguyen, supra note 48, at 250 (“parents who filed for consumer bankruptcy were likely to behave differently than their childless counterparts. They went out of their way to
save their homes, even when their incomes were far outpaced by those of non-parents.”). Other studies
have found an increased likelihood of families with children to be in bankruptcy, see Elizabeth Warren,
Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1019 (2002), or to revolve credit card debt. Haejeong Kim &
Sharon A. DeVaney, The Determinants of Outstanding Balances among Credit Card Revolvers, 12 FIN.
COUNSELING PLAN. 67 (2001); Carol C. Bertaut & Michael Haliassos, Debt Revolvers for Self Control,
(HERMES Center, Working Paper No. 01-11, 2001) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=276052; see also Glenn Canner & Charles Luckett, Consumer Debt Repayment Woes: Insights
from a Household Survey, 12 J. OF RETAIL BANKING 55 (1990) (finding more missed consumer debt payments for those with children). A study of earlier CBP data found higher loan-to-value ratios—and thus
more risk of default—to be associated with having children in the household. Bahchieva, Wachter &
Warren, supra note 36, at 97. However, this study also found high LTVs to be associated with lower
consumer debt, while filers with lower LTVs were significantly more likely to report out-of-control credit
card debt as a reason for filing. Id. at 98-99,102.
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ables. For example, we lacked proprietary credit scores. Although other
studies of bankrupt homeowners also do not have credit scores,82 credit
scores are, at least in theory and often in practice, important determinants of
the likelihood of mortgage default and foreclosure initiation.83 In addition,
we were not able to construct valid debt-to-value ratios for the group of
respondents who completed the homeownership telephone survey. The 2007
CBP collected this information but the number of missing values for this subsample was too great and the bias too systematic between the cases with and
without missing variables to include them in our models.84 Our “bad access to
credit” variable was an imperfect proxy for credit score.
We also did not have a precise timeline of missed payments and foreclosure initiation. There is potential endogeneity not only between missing payments and foreclosure initiation, but between filing for bankruptcy and
missing payments. In a time of financial stress, a homeowner may miss some
mortgage payments, decide to file a chapter 13 bankruptcy case, and then
miss additional mortgage payments before actually submitting the filing
paperwork to the bankruptcy court. We did as much as we could to wrestle
with these issues. Still, our foreclosure initiation models have shortcomings:
the two-stage model used a predicted value for missed mortgage payments
from a rather weak proxy, while the three-to-five-missed payment model used
a rather small sample, and it is possible (though we think unlikely) that
largely two different groups may combine in this single category—those who
missed all or most of the three to five payments before foreclosure was initiated and those who missed all or most of their three to five payments after.
Some readers might object more generally to the reliance on self-reported
data from debtors.85 Self-reported data are often the only way to get rich
detail, perhaps explaining why survey data are so frequently used in the social
sciences. The key is careful design of the survey instruments. Furthermore,
given the recent evidence of errors made in data collection by loan servicers,
including in the bankruptcy context,86 it is not obvious that servicer data
82

See, e.g., Carroll & Li, supra note 51, at 118-19 (describing data sources for a study of whether
bankrupt homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure, and appearing not to have individual credit scores).
83
See, e.g., Canner & Luckett, supra note 81; Sonia M. Livingstone & Peter K. Lunt, Predicting Personal Debt and Debt Repayment: Psychological, Social and Economic Determinants, 13 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
111 (1992); Diann C. Moorman & Steven Garansky, Consumer Debt Repayment Behavior as a Precursor to
Bankruptcy, 29 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 219 (2008).
84
We tried running models using these variables to see if we could extract usable information about
them despite the number of missing values and systematic bias in missing values. Results were volatile,
but suggested that having a high original mortgage payment-to-income ratio had a positive impact on the
number of missed payments, and low loan levels at bankruptcy had a negative impact.
85
Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior; An Alternative Account of
Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 547-48 (2006) (discussing and responding to
self-reporting critique).
86
Porter, supra note 48.
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would have been inherently more reliable than data from other sources. In
the future, researchers will have some improved access to information about
mortgage delinquency among bankruptcy filers; in December 2011, new rules
and forms will come into effect that require a lender claiming a security interest in a debtor’s principal residence to carefully document the components of
the debt and costs.87 However, this may not be helpful for studying chapter
7 cases because mortgage holders do not always file proofs of claim in such
cases.88 Thus, self-reported data by debtors will remain relevant and useful.
Notwithstanding these limits, our study found strength in the breadth
and depth of the primary dataset, the 2007 CBP, which enabled us to both
paint a richer picture of bankrupt homeowners and to test variables that are
unavailable in other types of studies. More specifically, we were able to look
at the influence of household characteristics, coping behavior when faced
with financial crisis, and a variety of demographic variables. We hope our
findings will provoke researchers to undertake additional studies that can
combine the benefits of these datasets with the important variables that we
were missing.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We found that a significant portion of financially distressed homeowners
in bankruptcy managed to avoid mortgage delinquency and that they differed
from the bankrupt homeowners with mortgage problems in several important
respects. Although our study was exclusively of bankruptcy filers, the findings raise questions relevant to consumer credit policy, the operation of chapter 13, and state foreclosure law reform.
A. CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION AND POLICY
Mainstream consumer credit access was consistently an important factor
in reducing the likelihood of mortgage trouble. The very fact of continued
access to mainstream credit may indicate better credit histories and/or a
stronger financial position relative to other distressed families. These filers
may have had greater ability to keep secured debts current, and, when they
did not, they may have appeared as stronger candidates for a workout to
avoid slipping into serious delinquency. This was consistent with our finding
that older respondents were less likely to become seriously delinquent even if
they missed a mortgage payment.
There is an alternative explanation: credit card usage may itself have been
87

See Official Bankr. Form B-10 (Proposed Amendments 2011), and FED. R. BANKR. P. 3011(c) (Proposed Amendments 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed%200810/Proposed%20Rules%20and%20Forms%20Amendments.pdf.
88
See generally Porter, supra note 48, at 141-42 (discussing why mortgage claims are filed more frequently in chapter 13 than in chapter 7).
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the lever, filling in other financial gaps so that a debtor could keep a mortgage
current.89 Indeed, on the telephone survey, about a quarter of filers who
missed mortgage payments specifically reported using credit card cash advances as a method of getting caught up on their mortgages.90
Given the already-complicated intersections between consumer credit,
mortgage problems, and sustainable homeownership, our findings arguably
raise more questions than they answer. Whereas credit card access is associated with a lower risk of mortgage problems in our study, other writings
suggest that high credit card debt burdens arise because housing is, in fact,
unaffordable without subsidizing expenses with high-cost debt.91 This is perhaps a darker, but not implausible, interpretation of our findings.
Other studies have connected the issues entirely differently. For example, some researchers have identified circumstances under which homeowners
were actually more likely to pay their credit card bills than their mortgages.92
In addition, some authors have raised concerns that, before the financial crisis,
homeowners accepted offers of cash-out mortgage refinancing, putting their
homes at greater risk, for the very purpose of paying credit card debt.93 As
reported in Part IIIA, payment of credit card debts was the most popular
reason reported by the respondents in our sample for taking out a second
mortgage or doing a cash-out refinancing. To the extent these findings illustrate that homeowners were anxious to retain consumer credit liquidity to
deal with other key expenses, they can be seen as consistent with our results
showing that debtors leaned heavily on credit cards in exactly that
circumstance.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the intersection between consumer
credit and mortgage debt is sure to evolve further. For example, the CARD
Act and associated regulations should affect the quality, and possibly the
quantity, of the credit card opportunities available to households of modest
89

See Cohen-Cole & Morse, supra note 21, at 2 (describing insurance function of consumer credit). See
generally Eric S. Belsky, Ren S. Essene & Nicolas P. Retsinas, Consumer and Mortgage Credit at the
Crossroads, in BORROWING TO LIVE, supra note 24, at 11, 59 (discussing role of consumer credit in
smoothing consumption).
90
The question was “When you got behind on the mortgage payments, did you do, or try to do, any of
the following things to get caught up? Did you: [followed by a list of pre-coded responses].” 2007 CBP
Housing Telephone Survey, H46 (2007) (emphasis in original) (on file with authors).
91
Tamara Draut & Javier Silva, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth of Credit Card Debt in the
‘90s 31 (Demos Working Paper 2003). See generally Belsky, Essene & Retsinas, supra note 89, at 7 (reviewing arguments that consumer debt loads are amplified by cost of living, including housing costs).
92
See, e.g., Cohen-Cole & Morse, supra note 21.
93
Lisa James & Jabrina Robinson, Risking Homes to Pay Credit Cards: Debt-consolidation Mortgage
Refinancing Is Not a Winning Financial Formula for Many Families 4 (Ctr. for Responsible Lending Issue
Paper No. 12, 2005); Tamara Draut et al., The Plastic Safety Net: The Reality Behind Debt in America 1415 (Demos & Ctr. For Responsible Lending, Report, 2005).
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means.94 Likewise, the Dodd-Frank Act, a financial reform law, will affect
mortgages not only substantively, but through the introduction of a new regulator, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, and the reinvigoration
of the rights of state-level actors to engage in enforcement of their own.95 It
is too soon to predict the overall impact of these legal changes, but one should
not merely assume that these reforms will effectuate a blunt decline in credit
access.96 In any event, our findings emphasize the potential linkages between
consumer credit and mortgage credit markets, and the importance to regulatory design of being attentive to these relationships.
B. CHAPTER 13 REPAYMENT PLANS
Our findings emphasize the importance of stable incomes for homeownership sustainability. Those with big declines in income were significantly
more likely to miss a mortgage payment, and the self-employed were more
likely to fall into serious delinquency after missing one payment. The findings are consistent with research in the general population illustrating the
significant incidence of unemployment or curtailment of income among homeowners who become delinquent on mortgages.97 The results also echo larger
trends of income volatility in the general population documented by Jacob
Hacker and others.98 However important income stability may be in general,
it is even more important if a debtor is to have any hope of curing a mortgage
in chapter 13. Chapter 13 eligibility is explicitly contingent on having “regu94

Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123
Stat. 1734 (2009); Elizabeth Warren, The CARD Act: One Year Later, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau CARD Act Conference (Feb. 22, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
speech/the-card-act-one-year-later/).
95
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010). See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home
Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681 (2011) (exploring how Dodd-Frank affects home mortgage markets,
with a particular focus on Parts X and XIV of the legislation); Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory
Innovation, and the Safety of Consumer Financial Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 106-07 (2011)
(discussing Dodd-Frank’s reinvigoration of state consumer protection efforts).
96
See, e.g., Raphael W. Bostic et al., The Impact of State Antipredatory Lending Laws: Policy Implications and Insights, in BORROWING TO LIVE, supra note 24, at 153-54, 162 (finding counterintuitive but
robust effects of broader coverage of anti-predatory lending laws); see also Proposed Definitions of Qualified Mortgage for Dodd-Frank Safe Harbors, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,390, 27,391 (proposed May 11, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
97
Belsky, Essene & Retsinas, supra note 89, at 53 (reviewing Freddie Mac data from 2001-2005 and
2006, and noting “[t]hese data plainly show that unemployment or other income curtailment is the principal reason that borrowers, or at least borrowers of prime mortgage credit, default on their loans.”).
98
Jacob Hacker, The Risky Outlook for Middle-Class America, in ENDING POVERTY IN AMERICA,
supra note 19, at 66, 73 (using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data to study income trends of American
households over time). In addition to providing systematic empirical support, Hacker specifically tied
income with homeownership sustainability when he highlighted a story of a man with greatly fluctuating
income who was losing his home. Id. at 68.
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lar income.”99
The observed association between missed payments and mortgage broker
use underscores the potential benefits of regulating the licensing and registration of brokers for reducing problem loans. Mortgage broker use, at least
among those with modest means, has been associated with higher rates of
high-cost features.100 Because curing a mortgage requires full payment of
costs under the mortgage,101 we see even more of a mismatch between the
structure of chapter 13 and the circumstances of people who have mortgages
in need of curing.
Some homeowners may have sufficiently changed circumstances that
keeping a home is truly not feasible under any reasonable set of laws. However, for others, permitting mortgage loans to be restructured and reduced to
the value of the collateral could improve sustainability by reducing associated
monthly mortgage payments.102 As a separate matter, the bundled legal tools
in chapter 13 could be disaggregated.103 Currently, a debtor’s mortgage relief
is conditioned on payment of a wide range of other costs, most of which are
unrelated to housing policy objectives.104 Congress could reduce the amount
of unsecured debt required to cure a mortgage, or could establish a singlechapter bankruptcy system in which the obligation to repay unsecured debt
is delinked from the right to restructure a mortgage.105 The latter has the
advantage, at least in theory, of substantially reducing the administrative
costs associated with mortgage curing.
99

11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2010) (conditioning eligibility for chapter 13 on regular income, among other
criteria).
100
Engel & McCoy, supra note 30, at 89 (discussing how compensation structure and regulatory gaps
create incentives for brokers “to maximize their profits at the expense of borrowers.”); Michael S. Barr,
Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Credit Regulation, in BORROWING TO LIVE, supra note 24, at 170, 196-97 (reviewing data on use of yield spread premiums by
brokers, noting that brokers dominated the subprime mortgage market, and arguing that incentives of
creditors and investors must change so as to better monitor brokers); id. at 193 (evaluating reforms in
which brokers would have to make disclosures about the pricing of the loan and the borrower’s qualification for other credit products).
101
See supra note 14.
102
Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 14, at 1131 (studying mortgage burdens among chapter 13
filers and noting that “bankruptcy law’s current prohibition on modifying home mortgage loans is a serious
limitation on bankruptcy’s usefulness as a home-saving device.”). For an explanation of how a debtor can
seek to modify a mortgage without legislative change using equitable subordination principles, see Moringiello, supra note 14. For an example of a more automated zip-code-based modification approach that is
not dependent on a bankruptcy filing, see Eric Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to
the Housing Crisis, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 577 (2009).
103
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Legal Infrastructure of Ex Post Consumer Debtor Protections, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 751, 759-60 (2011).
104
Cf. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 142-43 (observing another way in which
bankruptcy law does not protect the objective of homeownership expansion).
105
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for Simplification
and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1327-28 (2006).
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C. STATE FORECLOSURE LAW REFORM
We found that longer foreclosure timelines were associated with a lower
probability of foreclosure initiation and shorter timelines were associated
with a higher probability of foreclosure initiation.106 Notwithstanding the
limits of our models, these results are consistent with the view that state
foreclosure laws that impose greater expense on lenders and servicers—as
longer foreclosure timelines do—deter foreclosures and may encourage
workouts.107
More generally, our results highlight the connection between federal
bankruptcy law and state mortgage law, and the importance of continued
innovation in the latter category. Long treated as two entirely separate systems because they were produced through different formal channels, bankruptcy and state foreclosure law function together as an integrated system.108
Our results suggest that state foreclosure laws that are more protective of
homeowners, at least on an ex post basis, may increase the effectiveness of
bankruptcy by allowing filers to focus on their unsecured debt problems,
which are far simpler to address.109 Just as state wage garnishment laws may
affect how many of a state’s citizens go bankrupt,110 state foreclosure timelines may affect the quality and cost of debt relief achieved if they cannot
avoid bankruptcy.

106

The real estate literature suggests that servicer contact could be driving the results, but we did not
see signs in our sample that this is the case. As previously noted, this sample had a high level of reported
servicer contact (approximately 80%), making this unsuitable to be used in the modeling. However, while
respondents in slow foreclosure states reported a higher rate of contact than those in the middle-speed
foreclosure states, a simple descriptive analysis illustrated no correlation between servicer contact and
foreclosure initiation. In states with fast foreclosure timelines, foreclosures were initiated in half of delinquencies regardless of whether or not delinquent borrowers reported servicer contact. In slow foreclosure
states, foreclosures were initiated approximately 40% of the time, again whether or not the debtor reported contact. In the middle third of states, borrower-lender contact lowered the average foreclosure
initiation rate from 73% to 61%, but this difference was well within the large margin of error due to the
small sample size.
107
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency
Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2293-94 (2008) (“By making and keeping foreclosure laws more
cumbersome, the government tilts the cost-benefit analysis in favor of private resolutions in a wide range
of circumstances. Phrased more directly, if legislatures implemented proposals to greatly streamline foreclosure, lenders likely would pursue formal debt enforcement in a greater proportion of delinquencies.”).
108
Jacoby, supra note 103.
109
Some readers may lament that state foreclosure laws which make the process more cumbersome
increase the cost of credit ex ante but some researchers who find an association between mortgagor protection and higher costs or reduced access recognize that the social insurance benefits may outweigh such
costs. See, e.g., Pence, supra note 24, at 182.
110
See, e.g., Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J. L. ECON. 367 (2009) (analyzing state differences in bankruptcy filing rates using zipcode level data and finding that states with lower wage garnishment exemptions had higher rates of
bankruptcy filings).
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APPENDIX A: Descriptive Statistics
Table A-1: Characteristics of Bankrupt Homeowners, 2007 CBP Housing
Survey

Dummy Variables

Percentage
Number Number in Category
in
in
(of
Sample Category Universe)

Race/Ethnicity – Minority [not non-Hispanic
white]

639

157

0.25

Family Type – Married

658

345

0.52

Family Type – Children in household

654

285

0.44

Age of Bankruptcy Filer – Age 35 and under

622

117

0.19

Age of Bankruptcy Filer – Age 36 to 55

622

363

0.58

Age of Bankruptcy Filer – Over age 55

622

142

0.23

Education – High school graduate or less

639

205

0.32

Education – Some college

639

309

0.48

Education – College graduate or higher

639

125

0.20

Employment – Household head was self
employed

614

124

0.20

Income – Head or spouse experienced a gap

652

360

0.55

Income – Household experienced a drop

655

304

0.46

Home was a mobile home

658

131

0.20

First time homebuyer

656

357

0.54

Mortgage Loan – Used a mortgage broker for
original loan

550

182

0.33

Mortgage Loan – Original loan was an
adjustable rate mortgage

556

140

0.25

Filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy

658

272

0.41

State foreclosure process timeline111 in quickest
33% of states

658

207

0.31

State foreclosure process timeline in slowest
33% of states

658

238

0.36

State law allows non-judicial foreclosure process

658

371

0.56

Low-income county (county median
income<90% of state median)

614

142

0.22

High-income county (county median
income>110% of state median)

614

174

0.27

Filed bankruptcy because of burden of mortgage
payments

658

148

0.22

111

Fast and slow foreclosure states are derived from Cutts & Merrill, supra note 24, at 203.
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Table A-1 (cont’d)
Percentage
Number Number in Category
in
in
(of
Sample Category Universe)

Dummy Variables
Filed bankruptcy because of constant debt
collectors calls

658

288

0.44

Filed bankruptcy because of medical reasons

658

309

0.47

Coped with bills by borrowing from family/
charity

658

436

0.66

Coped with bills by relying heavily on credit
cards

658

429

0.65

Had bad access to mainstream credit112

658

287

0.44

Missed a mortgage payment in the 2 years
prior to bankruptcy

575

312

0.54

Missed 4 or more mortgage payments in 2
years prior to bankruptcy113

283

149

0.53

Lender initiated the foreclosure process

570

182

0.32

582

n/a

1.98

Continuous Variable
Mortgage Payments Missed in 2 yrs Prior to
Bankruptcy114 – Number(#)

Table A-2: Demographic Comparison of Primary Petitioner Homeowners
in 2007 CBP with American Housing Survey Homeowner Householders
Percent Distribution
of Homeowners

Percent Distribution
of Homeowners

CBP
Housing
Phone
Survey

CBP
CBP Mail
Housing
Survey
Phone
Only
Survey
Sample

American
Housing
Survey

Marital Status
Married

Marital Status
53.0

63.9

Married

Widowed

6.9

11.3

Divorced

23.0

Separated

5.7

112

53.0

52.3

Widowed

6.9

7.1

13.6

Divorced

23.0

24.8

1.4

Separated

5.7

5.5

This proxy variable reflects those who coped with their bills through payday or car title loans or
filed bankruptcy because they could not refinance their current mortgage.
113
The universe drops from 312 to 283 because 29 respondents reported having missed a payment but
did not report the number of payments they missed.
114
The number of missed payments was top-coded at seven to reduce the over-influence of a small
number of outliers with an extreme number of missed payments.
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Appendix B: Modeling Approach for Missed Payments
We constructed logit models that draw on a common set of covariates
intended to capture observable information that might bear on the mortgage
payment behavior of homeowners who file for bankruptcy. Specifically, our
delinquency models take the form of the log odds ratio of missing at least one
payment P (or four or more payments) as a linear combination of a vector of
variables X that influence whether or not payments are missed. We included
demographic variables, income-related variables, mortgage-related variables,
bankruptcy-related variables, access to credit, and type of foreclosure law in
the states in which they resided. While most variables entered into the
model are binary variables by definition, other variables such as age and education were transformed into categorical binary variables in order to identify
more complex relationships that may be categorical and nonlinear, as opposed
to simply incremental. This reflects demographic research on bankruptcy indicating that the propensity to file bankruptcy did not simply decrease with
years of education; rather, it began low for those who did not graduate high
school, was highest for high school graduates and then decreased with additional years of higher education.115 The results of the logit model of the odds
of ever having missed a mortgage payment in the two years leading up the
filing are presented in table B-1. Coefficients are shown as odds ratio estimates rather than logged odds in order to more directly show the independent effect of each variable on the likelihood of missing a mortgage payment.
Table B-1 also reports the results of the logit model of the odds of four or
more payments missed by delinquent borrowers only (conditional on missing
at least one payment). Among just those having been delinquent, the relationship to missing four or more payments is less clear. Results show the
strict model is nowhere near as robust as the previous model on missing any
payments, but still it fits reasonably well as judged by the Hosmer &
Lemeshow Goodness of Fit chi-square statistic, and it does not suffer from
high variance inflation among any collinear covariates.

115

Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 115 (2003).
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Table B-1: Modeled Probabilities of Missing Mortgage Payments

Variable

Missed a
Payment116

Missed
Four or
More
Payments

Universe

All Borrowers

Delinquent
Borrowers

Odds Ratio
Estimates

Odds Ratio
Estimates

Race/Ethnicity – Minority [not non-Hispanic white]

1.08

1.01

Family Type – Married

0.91

0.83

Family Type – Children in household

1.54

1.15

Age of Bankruptcy Filer – Age 35 and under

0.74

0.53

Age of Bankruptcy Filer – Over age 55

1.10

0.73

Education – High school graduate or less

0.98

0.63

Education – College graduate or higher

1.35

0.53*

Employment – Household head was self employed

1.04

2.54**

Income – Head or spouse experienced a gap

1.05

1.27

Income – Household experienced a drop

1.91***

1.22

First-time homebuyer

0.95

1.24

Mortgage Loan – Used a mortgage broker for original loan

1.64**

0.72

Mortgage Loan – Original loan was an adjustable rate
mortgage

1.11

0.58

Filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy

1.94***

0.62

Filed bankruptcy because of burden of mortgage payments

3.03***

1.03

Filed bankruptcy because of constant debt collectors calls

1.89***

0.83

Filed bankruptcy because of medical reasons

0.92

1.05

Coped with bills by borrowing from family/charity

1.88**

1.36

Coped with bills by relying heavily on credit cards

0.44***

0.57*

Had bad access to mainstream credit

2.17***

1.24

N

425

217

R^2

0.23

0.11

Adjusted R^2

0.31

0.15

Likelihood Ratio
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness of Fit (Pr > ChiSq)

111.3
0.87

25.8
0.91

*** : significant at the 99% level
** : significant at the 95% level
* : significant at the 90% level
116

Logit model coefficients displayed are estimated odds ratios. Logistic models display maximumlikelihood-based ‘pseudo’ R-squared measures of goodness of fit. The adjusted R-squared re-scales the
pseudo R-squared measure to enable a maximum value of 1, which is not possible otherwise.
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Appendix C: Modeling Approach for Foreclosure Initiation
We deployed a two-stage least squares approach to handle the endogeneity between missed mortgage payments (decisions made by borrowers)
and foreclosure initiations (decisions made by lenders). The models are fit
only for borrowers that missed at least one payment.117
The two-stage least squares procedure cannot be extended to non-linear
models, so we shifted to OLS modeling. The first stage is a streamlined OLS
model similar to the logistical delinquency models presented above but on the
number of payments missed. To determine our streamlined model, we performed stepwise selection on the covariates, requiring all variables to have Fstatistics significant to the 90% level to be entered or to remain within the
model, meaning that each variable must account for a significant reduction in
model error. At the same time, we looked to maximize a balance between the
overall F-statistic of the model and the adjusted r-squared value of overall fit.
In this process, variables found to be insignificant in the previous delinquency
models such as race, family type and age drop out of the model and the instrument for the number of payments missed is streamlined to the following reduced-form equation:
Stage 1: P = bX + u

(1)

In this equation, P is the number of mortgage payments missed and X is
reduced to a vector of four instrumental variables: being self employed, having experienced a gap in income either by the household head or spouse, having originally had an adjustable rate mortgage, and having coped with bills
prior to bankruptcy by relying heavily on credit cards. The strength of the
four instruments in predicting the number of mortgage payments missed is
shown in table C-1.

117

There was a very small number of unusual cases in which filers reported foreclosure initiation
without reporting missed mortgage payments.
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